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Abstract
Due to changes in the global agricultural system and support from various organizations,
contract farming has recently been significantly expanded in many developing countries.
A considerable body of literature analyses the impact of contract farming on the welfare
of smallholders, whereas its impact on efficiency and productivity is mostly overlooked.
This study addresses this salient gap by combining the approaches suggested by Bravo-
Ureta, Greene, and Solís (Empirical Economics 43:55–72, 2012) and Rao, Brümmer, and
Qaim (American Journal of Agricultural Economics 94:891–912, 2012). We first use the
approach of Bravo-Ureta, Greene and Solís (2012) to estimate two separate production
frontiers (one for contract farmers and one for non-contract farmers) that account for
potential biases due to self-selection on both observed and unobserved variables. Then,
we follow Rao, Brümmer and Qaim (2012) and create a meta-frontier in order to estimate
the effects of participation on the farms’ meta-technology ratio, their group technical
efficiency, and their meta-technology technical efficiency. The empirical analysis uses a
cross-sectional data set from sunflower farmers in Tanzania, where some of the farmers
participate in contract farming while others do not. We find a significant selection bias,
which justifies the use of the sample selection framework. Our preliminary results indicate
that contract farming significantly increases the yield potential (meta-technology ratio)
but lowers the group technical efficiency. As the first effect is slightly larger than the sec-
ond, we find a small positive effect of contract farming on productivity (meta-technology
technical efficiency). The positive effects on the yield potential and the (average) pro-
ductivity can be (at least partly) explained by the contractor’s provision of (additional)
extension service and seeds of high-yielding varieties to the contract farmers.
Keywords: Contract Farming, Sunflower, Technical efficiency, Productivity, Meta-Frontier,
Sample selection, Tanzania
JEL codes: D24, Q12
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1 Introduction
It has been recognized for many years that agriculture plays an important role in eco-
nomic development of developing countries (e.g. Hayami and Ruttan, 1971). It is also well
known that agriculture production in developing countries generally has a very low pro-
ductivity compared to non-agricultural production in the same country or to agricultural
production in developed countries. The low agricultural productivity often has many di-
verse reasons, e.g. limited knowledge about productivity-enhancing production methods
and highly productive technologies, limited availability of or access to highly productive
varieties and productivity-enhancing inputs, limited availability of liquidity and limited
access to credit, and/or reluctance to invest in productivity-enhancing measures due to
production risk, output price variability, and unreliable market access combined with
(rational) risk aversion of poor farmers.
Contract farming is seen as a tool to increase agricultural productivity in developing
countries, as it could solve some of the above-mentioned problems, e.g. by improving
access to knowledge, better technologies (e.g. highly productive varieties), productivity-
enhancing inputs, and credit and by providing more predictable output prices and guar-
anteed market access. In fact, contract farming in developing countries usually implies
that contractors enter into a contract with farmers—either directly with the farmers or
through farmers’ associations—for just one year at the time, where the farmer produces
a specific crop by following some guidelines and the contractor supplies production in-
formation and productivity-enhancing inputs on credit and guarantees to purchase the
output at a premium price (e.g. Porter and Phillips-Howard, 1997). Vertical integration
in production and marketing has often been a case for perishable products, products with
technical requirements, and economically important products (Bijman, 2008). Over time
however, this practice has been increasingly extended to several other mundane crops such
as sunflowers (Guo, Jolly and Zhu, 2007).
There exists a considerable body of literature that analyses the impact of contract
farming on the welfare of smallholders (e.g. Miyata, Minot and Hu, 2009; Prowse, 2012),
whereas its impact on their efficiency and productivity is mostly overlooked. A few studies
(e.g. Bravo-Ureta and Pinheiro, 1997; Begum et al., 2012) compare the productivity and
efficiency of contract farmers and non-contract farmers in developing countries but most
of these studies do not take into account that the farmers self-select into contract farmers
and non-contract farmers.
Moreover, most studies on the effects of contract farming focus on crops that are con-
sidered to be ideal contract crops, i.e. crops with specific characteristics such as high
perishability, requirements for product homogeneity, high hygiene, and food safety, or a
complex production process. There are only very few studies that analyze the causal ef-
3
fects of contract farming in commercial production involving low-value crops like sunflower
as it is done in this study.
The aim of this paper is to investigate the causal effect of participation in contract
farming on the productivity and efficiency of small-scale sunflower farmers in Tanzania.
We take into account the self-selection of farmers into contract farming by combining
the approaches suggested by Bravo-Ureta, Greene and Solís (2012) and Rao, Brümmer
and Qaim (2012). We first use the approach of Bravo-Ureta, Greene and Solís (2012)
to estimate two separate production frontiers (one for contract farmers and one for non-
contract farmers). This approach is based on a combination of a matching method and a
stochastic frontier production function that accounts for sample selection (Greene, 2010)
in order to correct for potential biases that arise from self-selection on both observed and
unobserved variables. Then, we follow Rao, Brümmer and Qaim (2012) and create a meta-
frontier in order to estimate the effects of participation on the farms’ meta-technology
ratio, their group technical efficiency, and their meta-technology technical efficiency.
The following section reviews the literature on contract farming and its impacts on
technical efficiency, productivity, and income; section 3 presents the suggested econometric
framework; section 4 describes the data and the empirical specification; section 5 presents
and discusses the results, and the last section concludes.
2 Review of the Literature
Contract farming is an agreement between farmers and buyers about the production
and the supply of agricultural products under pre-established conditions, and often at
pre-determined prices (e.g. Eaton and Shepherd, 2001; Andri and Shiratake, 2003; FAO,
2012). It is an institutional arrangement which—according to microeconomic theory—
develops in response to missing or imperfect markets (e.g. Grosh, 1994; Glover, 1994; Key
and Runsten, 1999). In theory, contracts improve the access of the smallholder farm-
ers to resources; e.g. yield-enhancing inputs, credit, information, services, and product
markets. Non-price factors involved in the contracts, such as technical assistance, train-
ing and education could further help farmers to improve their efficiency, productivity,
and profitability (e.g. Ruben and Sáenz-Segura, 2008; Chakraborty, 2009). And with pre-
determined prices, farmers are eventually able to have more stable farm incomes. Earning
additional income is a primary motivation for farmers to enter contracts (Bijman, 2008;
Little and Watts, 1994). Smallholders enter the contract if their expected gain of con-
tracting is greater than their reservation utility (Barrett et al., 2011; da Silva, 2005).
Even though earning additional income is the primary motivation for farmers to engage
in contract farming, farmers may also contract for other reasons (Prowse, 2012). Contract
farming can also be used to allocate risk between the smallholders and the contracting
firm (Bogetoft and Olesen, 2004). Smallholders usually take the production risk, whereas
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the contracting firms usually face the marketing risk (Carr and Banco, 1993; Glover, 1994;
Bogetoft and Olesen, 2004). Bogetoft and Olesen (2004) argue that most of the small-
holders use contract farming to diversify the risk rather than to maximize the production
volume.
2.1 Contract Farming in Developing Countries
Although contract farming is still a debatable form of institutional arrangement in the
agribusiness sector of developing countries, it is becoming more common. The change in
global economic climate and the need for market access facilitate its rapid spread (Oya,
2012). Contract farming plays a crucial role in the development of better market institu-
tions that foster small scale agriculture (Masakure and Henson, 2005), particularly in Sub
Saharan Africa (UNCTAD, 2009). For instance, in Kenya, contract farming accounts for
60 percent of tea and sugar production and almost 100 percent of cut flowers production;
in Mozambique, 400,000 smallholders are engaged in contract farming; and in Zambia,
contract farming accounts for 100 per cent of cotton and paprika production (UNCTAD,
2009). Birthal et al. (2008) outlines three reasons for the expansion of contract farming in
developing counties: namely, the reduction of the government’s role in service provision,
the increase in the number of supermarkets, and the increase in attention of donors.
Depending on the economic environment, there are generally about five applicable mod-
els in contract farming that are practiced in different places and countries (Bijman, 2008).
(a) The centralized model; this entails conditions under which a buyer buys from many
smallholder farmers contracted on individual basis or farmer groups. (b) The Nucleus
Estate Model; this refers to a situation where a contractor has his own farm on which
to produce the commodity but, in addition, the contractor outsources additional produce
from other independent farmers. (c) The Multipartite Model; this refers to a situation
where joint venture in contract farming exists between public and the private partners.
(d) The informal model; this refers to a situation where small contractors, usually lo-
cal traders or processors, work with the farmers on the basis of informal relations that
are generally oral and loose in their specifications. A farmer is only assured of market
for his produce at a price rate that is slightly higher than the market price, in certain
cases contractors do not even assure farmers of purchasing the produce. (e) Lastly, there
is the Intermediary Model; this involves processors as end buyers, while traders act as
middlemen between smallholder farmers (producers) and the processor (Bijman, 2008).
2.2 Contract farming and sunflower production in Tanzanian
Agriculture and particularly farm activities still constitute the major component of the
Tanzanian economy. The sector provides livelihood to more than 70% of the population.
It accounts for about 24% of the GDP, 30% of total exports and about 65% of raw
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materials for domestic industries. It provides significant linkages, both backward and
forward linkages with other non-farm sectors. Agriculture thus, constitutes the back bone
of the Tanzanian economy, and the advancement of the agricultural sector can contribute
to the economic development of the country.
Contract farming has existed in Tanzania for decades, but it has largely confined itself
to few traditional cash crops such as tobacco, tea, sisal and coffee. The National Strategy
for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (2010–2014) recognizes the development of the pri-
vate sector as the vehicle for economic growth and poverty reduction. Contract farming
is underlined as the appropriate strategy of involving the private sector in facilitating and
sustaining smallholder farming not only in few traditional cash crops but also in many
other crops including ordinary crops which may be produced commercially to enhance
economic growth and reduction of poverty at household level (TNBS, 2009; URT, 2009).
Recently, there is a growing interest in contract farming from both the government and
farmers. The government considers contract farming as one of the means of solving farm-
ers’ production and marketing problems. On the other hand, interest in contract farming
is growing because of the failure of many traditional farmers’ cooperatives. Cooperatives
were once the reliable form of farmer organization in Tanzania, but following their failure
to address and safeguard the pertinent interests, farmers have lost faith in them. Besides
cooperatives and contract farming, other forms of producer organizations have emerged
such as farmer groups, Saving and Credit Cooperative Societies (SACCOS), and small
scale farmers networks, e.g. Muviwata (URT and FAO, 2008).
Sunflower is a hardy crop that is tolerant to low rainfall and suited even to regions
with moderate rainfall (Mayhew and Penny, 2005). In Tanzania, sunflower grows well in
many parts of the country but the largest amounts of sunflower are produced in Dodoma
and Singida regions. The total amount produced in Tanzania has steadily increased over
time, from an average of 80,000 tons per year in 2000/2001 to about 489,387 tons per year
by 2010/2011 (URT, 2011), and the crop accounts for about 36 per cent of all oil seeds
produced in the country (RLDC, 2008). Other major oil seeds produced in the country
include groundnuts, oil palm, simsim and soya (URT, 2008).
The use of contracts in the production of sunflower in the Kongwa district (Dodoma re-
gion) began in the 2007/08 crop season. Contract farming was introduced in the sunflower
sector in Kongwa district as a way of improving business related to sunflower production
and marketing. It was introduced separately by two private firms: Uncle Milo Investment
Company Limited and RIG Investment Company Limited, both based in Dodoma urban
district (Salisali, 2012). The contract farming arrangement meant to address major prob-
lems that smallholder farmers often face in the area, the most critical ones being lack of
seeds of high-yielding varieties and lack of a reliable and profitable market for sunflower
produce. It also aimed at improving access of farmers to extension services and better
agronomics specific to sunflower production. It was envisaged that provision of training
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and assistance to farmers by contracting firms would increase the quality and quantity of
produced sunflower seeds, and would enhance commercialization of smallholder produc-
tion for increased incomes at household level (Salisali, 2012). In practice however, the
current contracts arrangements only include the provision of a single input, i.e. seeds of
high-yielding varieties, although other inputs and services such as fertilizers, pesticides,
credit, training, and extension service are as well important for improving the productivity
of sunflower farming.
2.3 Effect of contract farming on technical efficiency, productivity, and income
There is abundant literature that finds considerable technical inefficiencies and low returns
of smallholder farming business in developing countries (e.g. Koopmans, 1951; Farrell,
1957; Schultz, 1964; Timmer, 1971; Bravo-Ureta and Evenson, 1994). It is argued that
in small-scale agricultural production, inefficiency is often associated with factors related
to demographic characteristics of household, farm characteristics and the structure of
organization and management for which farmers are accustomed to (Forsund, Lovell and
Schmidt, 1980; Battese and Coelli, 1993). Furthermore, low levels of technical efficiency
may be caused by failures in the credit, insurance, information and product markets. Key
and Runsten (1999) argue that these market failures even prevent farmers from optimally
using the resources that they have in abundance such as land and labor. The gap between
what is actually produced and the potential output level remains hugely wide and the
income remains low. Improving technical efficiency of smallholders has the potential to
increase their productivity, total output, and incomes without requiring increase in inputs
or change of technology.
Several studies analyse the effect of contract farming on farmers’ income (e.g. Little,
1994; Key and Runsten, 1999; Singh, 2002; Warning and Key, 2002; PingSun, Sununtar
and Adam, 2008; Miyata, Minot and Hu, 2009) and most of these studies find a significant
positive effect. However, studies that analyze the effect of contract farming on efficiency
and/or productivity are rare. Several empirical studies find that contract farmers have a
higher technical efficiency and/or productivity than non-contract farmers (e.g. Warning
and Key, 2002; Ramaswami, Birthal and Joshi, 2006; Ruben and Sáenz-Segura, 2008;
Chakraborty, 2009), while other studies find no (significant) differences (e.g. Glover and
Kusterer, 1990; Miyata, Minot and Hu, 2009; Little and Watts, 1994). However, these
studies do not take self-selection into contract-farmers and non-contract farmers into
account. To our knowledge, the only study that analyzes the causal effect of contract
farming on technical efficiency and productivity has been done by Rao, Brümmer and
Qaim (2012) who find that participation in supermarket contracts leads to substantial
productivity gains for Kenyan vegetable farmers.
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3 Econometric Framework
In economics the terms efficiency and productivity are widely used and many times in-
terchangeably. Despite their similarity, linkages and interchangeable usage, efficiency and
productivity have important differences (e.g. Coelli et al., 2005). Productivity is the ratio
of the amount of output produced to the amount of resources used, whereas large values
of this ratio indicate higher productivity. Efficiency refers to both technical efficiency and
allocative efficiency. Our empirical analysis focuses on output-oriented technical efficiency,
which is measured by comparing the observed output with the maximum feasible (fron-
tier) output under the assumption of fixed input quantities. Through non-price factors,
contract farming may increase the yield per unit of inputs, which in turn may enhance
farmers’ technical efficiency, productivity, and incomes.
To evaluate the impact of contract farming on the technical efficiency and productivity
of sunflower farmers, we suggest and use a new multi-step procedure for causal inference
in efficiency and productivity analysis that is a combination of the two frameworks in-
troduced by Bravo-Ureta, Greene and Solís (2012) and Rao, Brümmer and Qaim (2012),
respectively.
Bravo-Ureta, Greene and Solís (2012) apply Propensity Score Matching (PSM) (Rosen-
baum and Rubin, 1983; Imbens, 2000; Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008) to create two matched
samples of contract farmers and non-contract farmers with similar characteristics in order
to remove (or at least reduce) observable differences between contract farmers and non-
contract farmers. As matching based on propensity scores does not necessarily improve
the covariate balance (Diamond and Sekhon, 2013), we obtain the matched samples by
genetic matching instead of propensity score matching. Genetic matching is based on
a genetic search algorithm that directly maximizes the covariate balance (Diamond and
Sekhon, 2013). In this study, we use 1-to-1 genetic matching without replacement, which
matches each contract farmer with exactly one non-contract farmer.
We further follow Bravo-Ureta, Greene and Solís (2012) and estimate two stochastic
frontier models, one for contract farmers and one for non-contract farmers. To deal with
biases from unobserved differences between contract farmers and non-contract farmers,
we use the stochastic frontier model proposed by Greene (2010) that accounts for non-
random sample selection. This model assumes that the unobserved characteristics in the
selection equation are correlated with the noise in the stochastic frontier model. The
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specification of this model is as follows:
yi = βc′xi + i for di = 1 (1)
yi = βn′xi + i for di = 0 (2)
di = 1[α′zi + wi > 0] (3)
i = vi − ui (4)
ui ∼ N+(0, σcu) for di = 1 (5)
ui ∼ N+(0, σnu) for di = 0 (6)
(wi, vi) ∼ N2
(
(0, 0), (1, ρc σcv, σcv2)
)
for di = 1 (7)
(wi, vi) ∼ N2
(
(0, 0), (1, ρn σnv , σnv 2)
)
for di = 0, (8)
where yi denotes the logarithmic output quantity of producer i = 1, . . . , N , xi is a vector
of logarithmic input quantities (and potentially interaction terms and quadratic terms
thereof), di is a binary dummy variable that is one for contract farmers and zero otherwise,
zi is a vector of covariates in the sample selection equation, i is the error term of the
stochastic frontier model that takes into account noise (vi) and inefficiency (ui), wi is
the error term of the selection equation, and α, βc and βn are parameter vectors to be
estimated. It is assumed that the inefficiency term ui follows a half-normal distribution
with dispersion parameter σcu (σnu) and that wi and vi follow a bivariate normal distribution
with variances 1 and σcv2 (σnv 2), respectively, and a correlation coefficient of ρc (ρn) for
(non-)contract farmers. Non-zero values of ρc and ρn indicate self-selection so that the
estimates of standard stochastic frontier models would be inconsistent. The log-likelihood
function of this model and a two-stage estimation procedure are described in Greene
(2010).
From the two estimated stochastic frontier models, we can derive the group-specific
technical efficiency estimates (TEi = E[e−ui ]) both for contract farmers and non-contract
farmers. By comparing these technical efficiency estimates, we can assess whether the
sunflower production of contract farmers or of non-contract farmers is closer to the pro-
duction frontier of the respective group of farmers. However, as the two groups of farmers
are compared to two different benchmarks, the comparison of the technical efficiency
estimates does not allow us to compare the productivity of the two groups of farmers.
Therefore, we follow Rao, Brümmer and Qaim (2012) and obtain a meta-frontier that
envelopes the production frontiers of the two groups of farmers (see also Battese, Rao and
O’Donnell, 2004; O’Donnell, Rao and Battese, 2008). We estimate the parameters of the
meta-frontier function (β∗) by minimizing the sum of the absolute differences between
the meta-frontier and the respective group-specific frontier at all observations, while the
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|β∗′xi − βc′xi di − βn′xi (1− di)|, (9)
s.t. β∗′xi ≥ βc′xi ∀ i (10)
β∗′xi ≥ βn′xi ∀ i. (11)





s.t. β∗′xi ≥ max(βc′xi, βn′xi) ∀ i, (13)
where x¯ = N−1∑Ni=1 xi is a vector containing the mean values of each element of xi in
the entire sample (Rao, Brümmer and Qaim, 2012). Based on the parameters of the
meta-frontier function (β∗), we can calculate the meta-technology ratios (MTRs) of the





if di = 1
βn′xi
β∗′xi
if di = 0.
(14)
The MTRs indicate how close the group-specific frontiers are to the meta-frontier, where
an MTR of one indicates that the group-specific frontier is equal to the meta-frontier.
The meta-frontier technical efficiency (TE∗i ) is composed of the group-specific technical
efficiency and the MTR:
TE∗i = TEi ·MTRi. (15)
The meta-frontier technical efficiencies indicate the technical efficiency with respect to
the meta-frontier.
4 Data and Empirical Specification
This study uses data from a cross sectional farm household survey conducted in the
Kongwa district, located in the Dodoma region in central agricultural zone of Tanzania,
between September and October 2012. The Dodoma region is the most important region
for sunflower production in Tanzania, e.g. in the year 2008, this region accounted for
22.5% of total sunflower production in Tanzania (RLDC, 2008). A two-stage sample
design was used to collect the data. First, eight villages from four wards were purposefully
selected because of the presence of sunflower contract farming in these villages. Then,
the contract farmers were randomly selected from the list of contracted farmers, and non-
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contract farmers were randomly selected from the village households list (after removing
the contract farmers). The data collection was carried out by face to face interviews with
the household heads using a structured questionnaire. In total, the data set includes
396 small-scale sunflower farmers, 201 contract farmers and 195 non-contract farmers.
The variables that are used in the production model, in the sample selection model,
and as covariates for the genetic matching are described in Table 1. The input and output
quantities are not used in the sample selection model and in the genetic matching, because
they may depend on the participation in the contract scheme. Descriptive statistics of
these variables are presented in Table 2 in the next section.
Table 1: Variables and their descriptions
Variable Unit Definition
Output quantity
YIELD kilograms sunflower seeds harvested
Input quantities
LAND acres land planted with sunflower
LABOR person days labor used for sunflower production
SEED kilograms sunflower seeds used as seed
IMPLE Tanzanian Shilling other inputs used for sunflower production
Further explanatory variables in the production function
WARD categorical the ward in which the household resides
Dependent variable of the selection equation
PARTIC dummy 1 indicates participation in contract farming
Covariates for matching and explanatory variables in the selection equation
FSIZE acres total farm size
HSIZE number number of people in the household
AGE years age of the household head
GENDER dummy 1 indicates a female household head
EDUC ordinal highest educational attainment of the household head
(1: no formal; 2: primary; 3: secondary; 4: diploma)
5 Results
In this section, we present and discuss preliminary results of the genetic matching, of
the sample-selection stochastic frontier models, and of the meta-frontier analysis. Most
calculations and estimations were done within the statistical software environment “R”
(R Core Team, 2015) using the add-on packages “MatchIt” (Ho et al., 2011), “Matching”
(Sekhon, 2011), and “rgenoud” (Mebane, Jr. and Sekhon, 2011) for genetic matching and
the add-on package “lpSolve” (Berkelaar and others, 2015) for linear programming, while
the sample-selection stochastic frontier models were estimated by LIMDEP 10.
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5.1 Genetic Matching
In order to remove (or at least reduce) observable differences between contract farmers
and non-contract farmers, we use 1-to-1 genetic matching without replacement, which
matches each contract farmer with exactly one non-contract farmer. From this, we obtain
one sample of contract farmers and one sample of non-contract farmers with similar
characteristics. The matching algorithm found 190 matching pairs of contract farmers
and non-contract farmers, while for 11 contract farmers and for 5 non-contract farmers
no corresponding farmer of the other group could be found. Descriptive statistics of the
original sample and of the matched sample are presented in Table 2.
Table 2: Summary statistics for the matched and unmatched sample
Variables Pooled Contract farmers Non-contract far. t-ratioa
Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Unmatched Sample
YIELD 378.54 406.16 430.35 428.20 325.13 375.78 2.6***
LAND 3.56 3.20 3.68 2.94 3.44 3.45 0.77
LABOR 22.87 17.57 22.95 18.12 22.79 17.04 0.09
SEED 11.50 11.79 11.24 11.37 11.77 12.22 -0.44
IMPLE 50467 60199 52722 56009 48144 64294 0.76
FSIZE 8.44 7.41 8.60 5.92 8.28 8.69 0.42
HSIZE 2.86 1.73 2.76 1.50 2.97 1.94 -1.20
AGE 42.43 12.71 43.47 13.24 41.37 12.07 1.65
GENDER 0.20 0.40 0.17 0.38 0.24 0.43 -1.78*
EDUCb 40975 37631 1.24
Observations 396 201 195
Matched Sample
YIELD 363.58 376.48 415.84 407.86 311.32 335.24 2.7***
LAND 3.48 3.15 3.58 2.90 3.39 3.39 0.58
LABOR 22.92 17.80 22.90 18.45 22.94 17.18 -0.02
SEED 11.38 11.77 11.04 11.36 11.72 12.18 -0.56
IMPLE 48984 59476 50695 54895 47274 63830 0.56
FSIZE 8.05 5.53 8.46 5.83 7.64 5.19 1.45
HSIZE 2.84 1.67 2.79 1.51 2.89 1.83 -0.61
AGE 42.48 12.84 43.61 13.39 41.36 12.19 1.7*
GENDER 0.20 0.40 0.16 0.37 0.24 0.43 -1.92*
EDUCb 36804.5 35585.5 0.75
Observations 380 190 190
Notes: ∗P = <0.10 ; ∗∗P = <0.05 ; ∗∗∗P = <0.01
a A t-test for testing whether the mean values of the variables are the same for contract farmers
and non-contract farmers.
b As EDUC is an ordinal variable, the table reports rank sums and the last column presents
the results of a Mann-Whitney U test.
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As described above, the matching is done based on the variables that are unlikely to be
affected by participation in contract farming but which may affect participation in con-
tract farming and/or productivity, i.e. FSIZE, HSIZE, AGE, GENDER, and EDUC. In
the original unmatched sample, the mean values of none these variables significantly differ
between contract farmers and non-contract farmers at the 5% level, and only the propor-
tion of female household heads significantly differs at the 10% level. As contract farmers
and non-contract farmers have very similar observable characteristics, it is questionable
whether the application of a matching method is indeed necessary in our application.
In the matched sample, the household size (HSIZE) and the household head’s education
(EDUC) are more similar between contract farmers and non-contract farmers than in the
original unmatched sample. However, the other three variables are slightly less similar
after matching. In our on-going work on this analysis, we will take a closer look at the
matching algorithm, e.g. to check whether better matching results can be obtained.
On average, the input quantities used for sunflower production do not significantly differ
between contract-farmers and non-contract farmers, neither in the original unmatched
sample nor in the matched sample. However, in spite of using similar input quantities, the
contract farmers produce on average significantly more sunflower seeds than non-contract
farmers (32% more in the original unmatched sample, 33.5% more in the matched sample).
This indicates that contract farmers have a higher productivity than non-contract farmers
both in the original unmatched sample and in the matched sample. However, these
comparisons do not take into account unobserved differences between contract farmers
and non-contract farmers.
5.2 Sample-Selection Stochastic Frontier Model
The first stage of the sample-selection stochastic frontier model is the estimation of equa-
tion (3) as a standard probit model. The estimation results of this model, using both the
original unmatched data set and the matched data set, are presented in Table 3. These
results indicate that smaller households and older household heads are, ceteris paribus,
more likely to enter a contract scheme than larger households and younger household
heads. The total farm size and the gender and education of the household head do not
have a significant effect (at 5% level) on the adoption of the contract scheme. When using
the matched data set, the entire model is no longer statistically significant (at 5% level).
This indicates that the matching has significantly reduced observable differences between
the samples of contract farmers and non-contract farmers.
We estimated the sample-selection stochastic frontier models both with the Cobb-
Douglas and the Translog functional form. In all cases, a likelihood ratio test revealed
that the fit of the Translog functional form was not significantly better than the fit of the
Cobb-Douglas functional form. Therefore, we use the Cobb-Douglas functional form in
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Table 3: Estimates of the Sample-Selection Equation
Parameters Unmatched Sample Matched Sample
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std.Err.
CONSTANT -0.816** 0.345 -0.709* 0.371
FSIZE 0.044* 0.024 0.022 0.038
FSIZE2 -0.001 0.001 -0.0002 0.001
HSIZE -0.089** 0.042 -0.078* 0.044
AGE 0.016*** 0.006 0.015** 0.006
GENDER -0.230 0.161 -0.276* 0.165
EDUC:PRIMARY 0.269 0.170 0.252 0.172
EDUC:SECONDARY 0.943* 0.502 0.706 0.556
EDUC:DIPLOMA 0.048 0.891 0.032 0.888
Log likelihood -262.58 -256.67
LR chi2(8) 19.58** 13.44*
Observations 393 380
Note: ∗P = <0.10 ; ∗∗P = <0.05; ∗∗∗P = <0.01
our analysis. The estimation results for contract farmers and non-contract farmers based
on the matched sample are presented in Table 4.
Table 4: Estimates of the Sample-Selection Stochastic Frontier Models for the Matched
Sample
Contract farmers Non-contract far.
Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
Constant 4.19*** 0.585 3.81*** 1.014
log(LAND) 0.401** 0.171 0.578*** 0.149
log(LABOR) 0.247** 0.102 0.298** 0.138
log(SEED) 0.261** 0.104 0.073 0.135
log(IMPLE) 0.049*** 0.014 0.027 0.017
WARD: Chamkoloma 0.049 0.121 0.358 0.228
WARD: Sagala 0.314* 0.173 0.216 0.299
WARD: Mlali 0.256 0.243 0.408 0.339
σu 1.01*** 0.106 0.221 1.031
σv 0.34*** 0.081 0.75*** 0.154
ρ -0.086 1.325 0.667** 0.327
Log likelihood -362.83 -289.82
Observations 190 190
Note: ∗P = <0.10 ; ∗∗P = <0.05; ∗∗∗P = <0.01
The estimated coefficients of the logarithmic input quantities are all positive so that
the monotonicity condition is (globally) fulfilled. Elasticities of scale of 0.958 and 0.976
for contract farmers and non-contract farmers, respectively, indicate that both groups of
farmers operate under slightly decreasing returns to scale.
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The dispersion parameter of the inefficiency term (σu) is much larger for the contract
farmers than for the non-contract farmers, which indicates that the contract farmers are
more affected by inefficiency than the non-contract farmers. In contrast, the standard
deviation of the noise term (σv) is much larger for the non-contract farmers than for the
contract farmers, which indicates that the non-contract farmers are more affected by noise
than the contract farmers.
The estimated correlation parameter (ρ) is small (in absolute terms) and statistically in-
significant for the contract farmers. This indicates that unobserved factors that affect the
participation in contract farming are not correlated with the noise term of the stochastic
frontier model. In contrast, the estimated correlation parameter (ρ) is significantly posi-
tive for the non-contract farmers. This indicates that unobserved factors that negatively
(positively) affect the participation in contract farming also negatively (positively) affect
the noise term of the stochastic frontier model. As the predictive power of the selection
model is low, the error terms of the selection model wi are negative for all non-contract
farmers so that the positive correlation coefficient (ρ) implies that the noise terms of the
stochastic frontier model for non-contract farmers have a tendency to be negative. Hence,
there is a significant sample selection bias due to unobserved factors, which justifies the
use of the sample-selection stochastic frontier model at least for estimating the stochastic
frontier model of the non-contract farmers.
The distributions of the technical efficiency estimates of the contract farmers and the
non-contract farmers are illustrated in Figure 1. While the technical efficiency estimates
of the contract farmers have a very large variation with an average value of 0.516, the
technical efficiency estimates of the non-contract farmers are all close to its mean value
of 0.839. The much higher (average) technical efficiencies of the non-contract farmers
compared to the contract farmers is a consequence of the much smaller value of σu and
the predominantly negative noise terms of the frontier model (vi) due to the negative
noise term of the selection model (wi) in combination with the significantly positive value
of ρ.
Having controlled for biases arising from both observable and unobserved differences
between contract farmers and non-contract-farmers, we can conclude that participation
in contract farming has a strong negative causal effect on technical efficiency. This means
that farmers who become contract farmers will be on average much further away from their
new production frontier (i.e. the contract farmers’ production frontier) than they were
away from their previous production frontier (i.e. the non-contract farmers’ production
frontier).
5.3 Meta-Frontier
The coefficients of the meta-frontier are presented in Table 5. In order to facilitate the
comparison with the coefficients of the coefficients of the group-specific production fron-
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Figure 1: Distributions of Technical Efficiency Estimates
tiers, these coefficients are presented again in this figure along with coefficients of the
meta-frontier. Most coefficients of the meta-frontier are very similar to the coefficients
of the contract farmers’ frontier, which indicates that the meta-frontier is similar to the
contract farmers’ frontier.
Table 5: Coefficients of the Meta-Frontier
Contract farmers Non-contract far. Meta-frontier
Constant 4.19 3.81 4.28
log(LAND) 0.401 0.578 0.408
log(LABOR) 0.247 0.298 0.248
log(SEED) 0.261 0.073 0.262
log(IMPLE) 0.049 0.027 0.040
WARD: Chamkoloma 0.049 0.358 0.050
WARD: Sagala 0.314 0.216 0.312
WARD: Mlali 0.256 0.408 0.255
This is confirmed by the meta-technology ratios, which are presented in Figure 2. Al-
most all contract farmers have a meta-technology ratio that is close to one (on aver-
age 0.982), which indicates that the meta-frontier is mainly defined by the contract farm-
ers’ frontier. In contrast, many non-contract farmers have a quite low meta-technology
16























Figure 2: Distributions of Meta-Technology Ratios
ratio (on average 0.574), which means that the non-contract farmers’ frontier is consider-
ably below the meta-frontier.
Based on these results, we can conclude that participation in contract farming has a
strong positive causal effect on the meta-technology ratio. This means that participation
in contract farming has a strong positive causal effect on the yield potential that the
farmer can obtain. This effect could be caused by the provision of (additional) extension
service or the provision of seeds of high-yielding varieties to contract farmers.
The distributions of the obtained meta-technology technical efficiencies are illustrated
in Figure 3. While the meta-technology technical efficiency estimates of the contract
farmers have a very large variation with an average value of 0.507, the meta-technology
technical efficiency estimates of the non-contract farmers have a much smaller variance
and a slightly lower mean value of 0.482.
As the meta-technology technical efficiency estimates of the contract farmers and non-
contract farmers are measured against the same production frontier (benchmark), we
can directly compare the meta-technology technical efficiency estimates between contract
farmers and non-contract farmers. Hence, we can conclude that participation in contract
farming increases the productivity of some farmers and decreases the productivity of other
farmers. As the positive effects slightly outweigh the negative effects, we find on average
a small positive effect of contract farming on productivity.
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Figure 3: Distributions of Meta-Technology Technical Efficiencies
6 Conclusions
Smallholder farmers in developing countries are characterized by remarkably low levels of
productivity and efficiency, which can be attributed to lack of market access, low techni-
cal knowledge, underdeveloped insurance and financial markets, and so forth. Contract
farming has the potential to alleviate some of these constraints and thus, could improve
the productivity of smallholders, which in turn could increase food-security and income.
In this study, we analyze the effect of contract farming on the technical efficiency
and productivity of small-scale sunflower farmers in the Kongwa district of the central
agricultural zone of Tanzania. of small-scale sunflower farmers in Tanzania. We suggest
an econometric framework for causal inference in efficiency and productivity analysis that
is a combination the approaches suggested by Bravo-Ureta, Greene and Solís (2012) and
Rao, Brümmer and Qaim (2012). This framework takes into account the self-selection of
the farmers into contract farming due to both observed and unobserved characteristics
and separates the effect in three components: the technical efficiency within the group,
the meta-technology ratio. and the meta-technology technical efficiency.
Our estimation results indicate that there is significant self-selectivity into contract
farming, which justifies the use of our approach. Furthermore, our results show that par-
ticipation in contract farming significantly increases the yield potential (meta technology
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ratio) but lowers the technical efficiency (measured to the respective frontier). As the
first effect is slightly larger than the second, we find a small positive effect of contract
farming on productivity (meta-technology technical efficiency). The positive effects of
contract farming on the yield potential and the (average) productivity can be (at least
partly) explained by the contractor’s provision of (additional) extension service and seeds
of high-yielding varieties to the contract farmers.
The results have two policy implications: (a) as contract farming increases the yield po-
tential and average productivity, contract farming arrangements may be an adequate tool
to improve the productivity of sunflower farmers, particularly if the contract arrangement
improves the farmers access to (additional) extension service and seeds of high-yielding
varieties; and (b) our result that inefficiency is even more widespread among contract
farmers than among non-contract farmers, indicates that not all farmers benefit from
participating in contract farming, which may be caused by insufficient provision of seeds
of high-yielding varieties and/or extension services to some of the contract farmers.
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